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NOTE
Bank Fiduciary Duty and Takeovers: Washington Steel
Corp. v. TW Corp.
Chemical Bank (Chemical) agreed to participate in a loan to Talley In-
dustries, Inc. (Talley) and TW Corporation' to be used to purchase the
outstanding shares of Washington Steel Corporation (Washington). Tal-
ley's initial tender offer 2 to Washington was rejected, but the offer was
subsequently renewed at a higher price.3 Washington then sued to enjoin
the tender offer, contending that Chemical had breached a fiduciary duty
by using confidential information that had been obtained in the course of
an earlier business relationship with Washington 4 in deciding whether to
finance the tender offer. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction
preventing Chemical from participating in the loan to Talley, holding that
the bank, having received the confidential information from Washington,
1. TW Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Talley Industries, Inc., organized
solely for the purpose of acquiring Washington Steel.
2. The term "tender offer" as it applies to securities is not defined by federal legisla-
tion. It is generally understood as an offer to buy a substantial block of securities of a public
company at a price above the current market value in an attempt to gain control of the
company. See generally E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1-34 (1977); 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 1-74 (1978); Schwartz, Definition of a Tender Offer, in CASH
TENDER OFFERS 15 (R. Haft chrm. 1974); Einhorn & Blackburn, The Developing Concept of
"Tender Offer": An Analysis of the Judicial andAdministrative Interpretations of the Term, 23
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 379 (1978); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1973). For the definition of tender
offer as used in the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 73
(Purdon Supp. 1979-1980).
3. Talley also filed a Schedule 14D- I Statement, which is required by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976). According to § 14(d), whenever a
person intends to make a tender offer for any class of any equity security registered under
§ 12 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976), that person must first file an information statement
with the Securities and Exchange Commission if, after consummation of the transaction,
that person will be the beneficial owner of more than 5% of such class. In addition to the
14D-1 Statement, Talley submitted a registration statement to the Pennsylvania Securities
Commission. The statement was filed in accordance with the Pennsylvania Takeover Dis-
closure Law, which provides that, unless exempt, any offeror intending to make a takeover
offer involving a target company or to acquire any equity securities of the target company
pursuant to the offer must file such registration 20 days prior thereto. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§ 74 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980).
4. In 1974 Chemical had made a loan to Washington. In connection with the loan,
Washington conveyed to Chemical nonpublic information that included quarterly financial
statements, a year-end statement dated Dec. 28, 1978, for fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1978,
and cash flow and earnings projections for Washington through 1982. Not only had Chemi-
cal participated in a loan to Washington but it also had served as one of two registrars for its
common stock. The trial court derived a duty from this latter relationship, but Washington
did not assert that basis on appeal.
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had breached a fiduciary duty by participating in the loan.5 The bank
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Held, reversed and remanded: A bank has no per se fiduciary duty to a
corporate borrower arising from the receipt of confidential information
from that borrower that would preclude the bank from participating in
financing the takeover of the corporate borrower, and a bank violates no
duty when it uses the confidential information in deciding whether to par-
ticipate in the financing. Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d
594 (3d Cir. 1979).
I. BANK FIDUCIARY DUTY TO CORPORATE BORROWERS
No state or federal statutory regulations restrict a bank from participat-
ing in a loan to one bank borrower that may result in the takeover of
another bank borrower. 6 Accordingly, a legal challenge to the bank's par-
ticipation depends upon the-common law principles of agency and fiduci-
ary duty.7 Courts generally have not applied the law of agency to find a
fiduciary duty in borrower and lender relationships, but instead have de-
scribed the relationship as one of debtor and creditor. 8 When a bank loans
5. Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1100 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 602 F.2d
594 (3d Cir. 1979). The trial court determined that the bank, by acting as registrar and by
receiving confidential information, was Washington's agent and thus had a duty not to act
adversely to Washington's interests. 465 F. Supp. at 1104-05. The bank's participation in
the loan was characterized as egregious and unethical conduct. Id. at 1105.
6. The National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-215b (1976), and state banking regulations
do not place any limitations on takeover loans. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 1220-1235
(West 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16 /2, § 132 (Smith-Hurd 1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 167,
§§ 46-68 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1977 & Supp. 1980); N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 103, 108 (Mc-
Kinney 1971 & Supp. 1979-1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 101-111 (Purdon 1967 & Supp.
1979-1980); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 342-101 to -115 (Vernon 1973 & Supp. 1980).
Bank loans to finance tender offers may have to comply with federal reserve regulations.
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 221.1-.4(u) (1979) (security credit and margin requirements).
7. Generally, the nature of the agreement determines whether a principal and agent
relationship exists. When money advanced to another is expressly labeled as money lent, no
agency results. See, e.g., Central Ga. Land & Lumber Co. v. Exchange Bank, 101 Ga. 345,
28 S.E. 863 (1897) (bank advancing money to cotton buyer not regarded as buyer's princi-
pal); Commercial Credit Co. v. L.A. Benson Co., 170 Md. 270, 184 A. 236 (1936) (a loan to
voting machine manufacturer does not make lender liable as principal).
8. See, e.g., In re Vickers, 557 F.2d 683, 688 (10th Cir. 1978) (relationship of bank and
bank director who borrowed money one of debtor and creditor; no fiduciary duty existed);
Graney Dev. Corp. v. Taksen, 92 Misc. 2d 764, 400 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (Sup. Ct.), a'd, 66
A.D.2d 1008, 411 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1978) (borrower cannot maintain action against bank for
breach of implied contract of confidentiality because no principal and agent relationship
existed, only one of debtor and creditor); Ruddy v. Oregon Auto. Credit Corp., 179 Or. 688,
174 P.2d 603, 609 (1946) (auto dealer borrowing money from bank on blank auto title certifi-
cates in creditor and debtor relationship to bank, not principal and agent); Grace v. Moll,
285 Pa. 353, 132 A. 171, 171 (1926) (relationship one of borrower and lender, not one of
confidential agent); Prater v. Fidelity Trust Co., 161 Tenn. 626, 34 S.W.2d 205, 207 (1930)
(relationship of bank and borrower undertaking to pay outstanding mortgage not one of
principal and agent). In addition courts have not found a fiduciary relationship between a
bank and its depositor. See, e.g., Klatt v. First State Bank, 206 Iowa 252, 220 N.W. 318, 320
(1928) (relationship of bank and depositor not confidential); Pritchard v. Myers, 174 Md. 66,
197 A. 620, 625 (1938) (relationship of bank and depositor one of debtor and creditor, not
one of trust). See generally Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 1344 (1976); 10 AM. JUR. 2d Banks § 339
(1963). For additional background on the issue of bank and customer relationships, see
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money, it does not agree to act on behalf of the borrower and subject to the
borrower's control; rather, the two parties act on their own behalf and for
their own benefit.9
A fiduciary duty between a bank and its corporate borrower may exist,
however, under special circumstances.' 0 In M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Mar-
cus,"I a New York court, although finally rejecting a corporate borrower's
claim,' 2 recognized that a bank fiduciary duty may exist in some instances
and rejected the narrow scope of debtor and creditor relationships, di-
recting that the actual relation of the parties should be examined to deter-
mine whether there has been a breach of trust.' 3 The court concluded that
the test is "the reposing of confidence-in the sense of trust-and its abuse
which must determine the result."' 4 In addition, the court advocated the
need to harmonize the necessities of a competitive industrial system of
Hagedorn, Fiduciary Aspects of the Bank Customer Relationship, 34 Mo. B.J. 406 (1978);
Note, Banks and Banking-Relationship of Depositor to Bank of Deposit, 10 N.Y.U. L.Q. 366
(1933); Note, Duties andLiabilities Arising From Bank-Depositor Relationship, 25 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 73 (1950).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958).
10. See, e.g., Brasher v. First Nat'l Bank, 232 Ala. 340, 168 So. 42, 46-47 (1936) (bank
that holds insurance proceeds in trust for customer has fiduciary duty); Stewart v. Phoenix
Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (1937) (confidential relationship exists when bank
customer of 23 years relies on bank officers for financial advice); Milohnich v. First Nat'l
Bank, 224 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (bank has obligation not to disclose
information about depositor's account to third parties); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank,
83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (1961) (bank has obligation not to reveal customer's account
information to third persons unless authorized); First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178,
182 (Iowa 1970) (bank president, who knows from borrower's questions that borrower trusts
him, must disclose encumbrance of property being acquired by borrower); Richfield Bank &
Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 309 Minn. 362, 244 N.W.2d 648, 652 (1976) (bank's special knowledge
of depositor's fraudulent activities placed bank under duty to disclose prior to making loan
to further fraud); Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597, 601-02 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (when
borrower seeks a loan to purchase property from bank officer and confides purpose of loan,
bank officer has duty to disclose his interest in proposed deal); Morgan v. First Nat'l Bank,
58 N.M. 730, 276 P.2d 504, 508 (1954),(bank has duty to depositors not to charge account
with a forged check because of relationship of confidence); M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus,
124 Misc. 86, 207 N.Y.S. 685, 690-91 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (whether there is a trust relationship
depends on actual relationship and whether confidence is shared); Burien Motors, Inc. v.
Balch, 9 Wash. App. 573, 513 P.2d 582, 586 (1973) (independent business such as bank or
realtor may have fiduciary duty when it assumes relationship of trust and confidence). But
see Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 196 N.W.2d 619 (1972) (even 20 years as
bank customer did not create fiduciary relationship).
11. 124 Misc. 86, 207 N.Y.S. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1924). In M.L. Stewart a plaintiff bank
depositor and a defendant bank vice-president had simultaneously negotiated for the
purchase of property. During a temporary lapse in negotiations, the defendant was errone-
ously informed by the plaintiff's treasurer-negotiator that the plaintiff had purchased the
property. The defendant learned the amount of the alleged purchase price and agreed to the
plaintiff's request for a loan to assist in financing the purchase. The defendant then renewed
negotiations for the property and closed the purchase. Plaintiff sought an action to impose a
trust on the realty and to secure a direct conveyance of the property on grounds that the
defendant had induced the vendor to break his agreement to sell to the plaintiff and had
breached a fiduciary duty arising from the interview in which the defendant agreed to ex-
tend a loan to the plaintiff.
12. The court decided that no fiduciary relationship had been created because the bor-
rower had conveyed false information in applying for the loan. 207 N.Y.S. at 693.




business with the teachings of morality and to enforce the requirements of
sound business ethics. 15
Noting that the relationship between a bank and its depositor is usually
one of debtor and creditor, the Arizona Supreme Court in Stewart v. Phoe-
nix National Bank 16 emphasized that in some circumstances a relationship
of trust may give rise to a fiduciary duty.' 7 The plaintiff in Stewart had
been a customer of the bank for twenty-three years, borrowing money on
several occasions. During this period, the bank's officers and directors had
also been his financial advisers. Although the action was dismissed on
other grounds, the court stated that the bank's role as financial adviser had
created a duty to disclose to the client all facts that might influence his
actions. 18 Furthermore, the court emphasized that the complexity of credit
and commerce during the 1930's had increased a bank customer's reliance
on its bank for financial advice.' 9 The court reasoned that this reliance
established a confidential relationship between the bank and its customer
and created a bank fiduciary duty.20
In 1977 the Missouri Court of Appeals in Pigg v. Roberston2l held that
when a bank knows or has reason to know that a customer is placing his
trust and confidence in the bank, a confidential relationship may be
found.22 When applying for a loan, the plaintiff had disclosed to an audi-
tor, who represented himself as a bank official, that the loan was to be used
to purchase a farm. The auditor soon thereafter purchased the farm for
himself. Stating that the disclosures were to be given the same protection
as if made to a regular bank official, the court found evidence to support a
finding of breach of a confidential relationship. 23
The particular issue of a bank's fiduciary duty in financing takeovers of
its customers was not addressed 24 until 1977 in American Medicorp, Inc. v.
15. Id.
16. 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937). The plaintiff bank customer sought damages for
loss through fraud as a result of the foreclosure of a mortgage given by the plaintiff as
security for indebtedness to the defendant bank. The plaintiff alleged that the bank had
assured him it would not foreclose and that the mortgage was being taken simply as a matter
of form to satisfy banking authorities. The plaintiff argued that he had a right to rely on the
bank's representation because of a confidential relationship arising out of his 23 years as a
bank customer and financial advisee of the bank's officers and directors.
17. 64 P.2d at 106.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The court stressed that in view of modem business practices, when it is alleged
that a bank has acted as the financial advisor of one of its customers for many years and that
the customer has relied upon such advice, the allegation, if proved, is sufficient to establish a
confidential relationship in regard to financial matters, and the bank is subject to the rules
applicable to confidential relationships in general. Id.
21. 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
22. Id. at 600.
23. Id. at 601-02.
24. Two other courts addressed the issue of a general bank fiduciary duty to corporate
borrowers. In Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 382 F.2d 454
(D.C. Cir. 1967), the court held that a contract between a bank and borrower does noi limit
the right of the bank to loan to the borrower's competitors. No duty exists, independent of
contract, that limits the right of the bank to make such loans. Id. at 460. In Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977), the
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Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.25 In American Medicorp
the corporate plaintiff had sued to enjoin the defendant bank from financ-
ing the acquisition of its stock through a tender offer made by another
corporation. At the time of the other corporation's tender offer, the plain-
tiff was a customer of the bank, having received financial advice and other
services. In addition, the plaintiff had supplied the bank with certain
nonpublic financial information. Plaintiff alleged that under the circum-
stances the bank had a per se fiduciary duty that was breached when the
bank made the loan to the aggressor corporation. 26 The plaintiff also con-
tended that the bank breached its fiduciary duty when it used the confiden-
tial information in deciding whether to make the loan and when it
furnished the information to the aggressor corporation. 27 The court de-
nied the injunction, holding that the takeover loan was not a breach per se
of the bank's fiduciary duty. A bank is not precluded under all circum-
stances from making a loan that facilitates the takeover of a customer. 28
Furthermore, an injunction would burden the free flow of bank financing
and the ability a bank has to deal with customers who may have adverse
interests to other customers. 29 In addition, the court found no evidence to
support the allegations 30 involving the confidential information. The court
court held that when a corporate merger broker has served previously as an investment
banker for a corporation and confidence is placed in him based on that relationship, the
corporation can rely on the preexisting and contemporaneous banker-client relationship for
fair disclosure. 553 F.2d at 1043. Because he is in a quasi-fiduciary position with the corpo-
ration, the broker has an affirmative common law duty to disclose material facts relating to
the proposed merger. Id. See also Microdot, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., No. 01-23-76 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., filed Jan. 21, 1976) (suit concerning issue of bank financing of a takeover dropped
when competing offer accepted).
25. No. 77 C 3865 (N.D. I11. Dec. 30, 1977). The infrequent use of cash tender offers as
a means of acquiring a substantial or controlling interest in publicly held companies may
explain the lack of litigation in this area. See Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover
Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135; Schwartz & Kelly, Bank Financing of
Corporate Acquisitions-The Cash Tender Offer, 88 BANKING L.J. 99 (1971). For the most
recent discussion of the legal issues involved in bank loans to finance tender offers, see
Herzel & Rosenberg, Loans to Finance Tender Offers.- Borrower's Problems That May Affect
the Bank, 96 BANKING L.J. 581 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Herzel & Rosenberg, Borrower's
Problems]; Herzel & Rosenberg, Loans to Finance Tender Offers.- The Bank's Legal
Problems, 96 BANKING L.J. 676 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Herzel & Rosenberg, The Bank's
Legal Problems]. For a general discussion of tender offers and takeovers, see E. ARANOW,
H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, note 2 supra; E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1973); A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES,
AND PLANNING (1979); J. FLOM, M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND TAKE-
OUTS-TENDER OFFERS AND GOING PRIVATE (1976); MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (J. Mc-
Cord ed. 1969); Osborne, Target Management and Tender Offers.- Proposals for Structuring
the Fiduciary Relationship, 15 HARV. J. LEGIS. 761 (1978); Corporate Takeovers-The Un-
friendly Tender Offer and the Minority Stockholder Freezeout, 32 Bus. LAW. 1297 (1977);
Tender Offer Developments, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 842 (1978); Tender Offer Symposium
(pts. 1-2), 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 375, 553 (1978).
26. No. 77 C 3865, slip op. at 3.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 7.
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id. at 8. In a companion case, Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286, American Medicorp, Inc. sought a
preliminary injunction to bar the aggressor corporation, Humana, Inc., from proceeding
with its tender offer. American alleged misuse of confidential information because the bank
19801
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did imply, however, that if the bank had used the confidential information
in deciding whether to make the takeover loan, such an act would be a
misuse of the information and a breach of the bank's fiduciary duty.3'
II. WASHINGTON STEEL CORP. V. TW CORP.
Against this background, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit decided Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp. The court con-
sidered two theories offered by Washington in support of the trial court's
finding that the bank had a fiduciary duty and had breached it.32 First,
Washington contended that when it entrusted Chemical Bank with infor-
mation, the bank impliedly assumed a per se fiduciary duty that was
breached when the bank participated in financing the aggressor corpora-
tion's tender offer. Second, Washington contended that the bank breached
a fiduciary duty arising from its receipt of the confidential information by
using that information in deciding whether to finance the tender offer.
A. Per Se Fiduciary Duty
By entrusting the bank with nonpublic financial information, Washing-
ton claimed that it had a reasonable expectation that the bank would not
take any action adverse to its interest; therefore, as a matter of law, the
bank was precluded from financing the tender offer. 33 The court found
this per se duty unprecedented 34 and refused to imply a duty whose sweep
had used the information in deciding to make the takeover loan. The court, citing American
Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental I11. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No 77 C 3865 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30,
1977), agreed with the Illinois court that American had not made a sufficient showing that
the bank had used the information in deciding whether to make the loan and denied the
preliminary injunction. In addition, the Humana court agreed with the Illinois court's hold-
ing that some kind of special duty on the part of the bank existed, concluding that a special
relationship does exist between a borrower and its bank that should preclude the bank from
disseminating or using confidential information obtained from the borrower for improper
purposes. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. at 92,829. The court emphasized
that because a bank plays such a critical role in determining whether tender offers will be
made and which management survives, the potential for conflict should be avoided by the
voluntary behavior of the bank itself. Id.
31. "If it does not rely on the confidential information of its customers in its files, we
believe that a bank is free to deal with any customer who comes to it." No. 77 C 3865, slip
op. at 7. See Note, Bank Financing of Involuntary Takeovers of Corporate Customers .4
Breach of Fiduciary Duty?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 827, 835-37 (1978) (it is entirely consis-
tent with the Stewart and Robertson cases to hold, as the American Medicorp court implied it
would hold, that a bank may not use or rely upon confidential information in deciding
whether to finance an involuntary takeover of that customer).
32. 602 F.2d at 599.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 600-01. The court cited American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental I11. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., No. 77 C 3865 (N.D. I11. Dec. 30, 1977), and emphasized that "[i]ndeed
the only case to have actually considered the legal issues raised by Washington has squarely
rejected identical contentions." 602 F.2d at 600. Although arguably similar, the facts in
American Medicorp represented a bank and borrower relationship that was closer than that
of Washington and Chemical. In American Medicorp the bank had advised the plaintiff on
financial matters, a close friendship between plaintiffs account existed, plaintiff had con-
veyed considerable amounts of confidential information to the bank, and plaintiff had made
a proposal to invite a bank officer to stand for election to plaintiffs board. For an analysis
of the relationship, see Note, supra note 31, at 832-33. The Third Circuit may have obscured
[Vol. 34
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was as broad and whose restrictions were as severe as that urged. 35 Al-
though the court distinguished M.L. Stewart & Co. I,. Marcus36 on its
facts, 37 it followed M.L. Stewart to the extent of recognizing the need to
consider and balance the competing demands of business necessity and
moral obligation. 38 The court found, however, that a per se rule would
undermine this economic necessity. 39 In addition, the court objected to a
per se rule on policy grounds, reasoning that such a duty would discourage
banks from dealing with a borrower's competitors or potential acquirers
and thus diminish the availability of funding for capital ventures. Compa-
nies seeking to protect themselves from takeovers could disperse their loan
business among the major banks and foreclose the banks from financing
competitors. 40 Finally, the Third Circuit stated that establishing a per se
rule is the province of the legislature,41 and a common law rule would
likely give way to the preemptive force of federal law.42
or ignored some of the distinguishing elements in American Medicorp in relying on the pol-
icy basis of its decision.
35. 602 F.2d at 599. On appeal, plaintiff argued that a fiduciary duty existed based on
express and implied contractual obligations, Brief for Appellee at 20, Washington Steel v.
TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979), or on the reasonable expectations of the parties. Id.
at 21. Washington cited Brasher v. First Nat'l Bank, 232 Ala. 340, 168 So. 42, 47 (1936), for
its definition of the duty based on contract as "the duty of requisite skill, fidelity, diligence,
and a proper regard for the rights of others." In addition, Washington argued that the
bank's duty was defined by the nature of Washington's expectation, and that Washington
was justified in presuming that the bank would treat the confidential information and the
corporate objectives embodied therein with the loyalty and good faith arising from its posi-
tion of trust and confidence. Brief for Appellee at 26. Finally, Washington urged that the
adversary nature of the bank's interests in its relationship with Washington and the aggres-
sor corporation created an inevitable conflict of interest. Id. at 27. The inevitability of
breach argued by Washington may have been what the court considered too broad and
restrictive, particularly since it emphasized the pragmatic need to allow banks to deal with
competitors.
36. 124 Misc. 86, 207 N.Y.S. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
37. 602 F.2d at 600.
38. Id. The business necessities specified by the court are the freedom of banks to serv-
ice competitors, the free flow of funds, and the necessity for banks to use all information at
their disposal for loan decisions. 1d. at 601, 603-04.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 601. The court's concerns may have been exaggerated. Dispersement of a
corporation's loan business may be impractical. In fact, most tender offer defense strategists
do not consider such a technique even though it has been discussed for some time. See, e.g.,
E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, note 2 supra; A. FLEISCHER, note 25 supra; C.
KANTER, TENDER OFFERS: MAKING AND MEETING THEM (1979). Butsee Herzel & Rosen-
berg, The Bank's Legal Problems, supra note 25, at 676-77; Wachtell, Special Tender Offer
Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433 (1977). The problem is more pervasive in countries
where the banking industry is more concentrated and fewer restrictions on branch banking
exist. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Brascan, Ltd., No. 79 Civ. 1917 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr.
12, 1979).
41. 602 F.2d at 601. The court noted current efforts in this regard. Congress, the
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
are currently considering the issue. See N.Y. Times, June 11, 1979, at DI, col. 1. See also
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 9.7(d), 42 Fed. Reg. 56,338 (1977), 43 Fed. Reg. 12,755 (1978), re-
printed in Herzel & Coiling, The Chinese Wall and Conflict of Interest in Banks, 34 Bus.
LAW. 73, 100 nn.79-81 (1978). Refusing to decide the issue might have been more consistent
with the court's position.
42. 602 F.2d at 601.
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B. Misuse of Confidential Information
Noting that mere receipt of confidential information imposed no duty
and that the trial court had made no express finding of misuse of informa-
tion by the bank, the Third Circuit, nevertheless, considered Washington's
second contention that the bank had used the confidential information in
deciding whether to make the takeover loan and that such use constituted
a breach of fiduciary duty.4 3 The court rejected the contention 4 because
no showing was made that the bank actually had used the information,4 5
and the aggressor corporation's purportedly weak financial position did
not raise a presumption of such use.46 Assuming, however, that the bank
had used the nonpublic information obtained from Washington in decid-
ing whether to make the loan, the court found that no breach of fiduciary
duty would have occurred.4 7 The court emphasized that a bank does not
violate any duty to its borrower when it uses information received from
that borrower in deciding whether to make a loan to another borrower.4 8
According to this decision, restricting the use of confidential information
by a bank's commerical loan department is not the proper subject for court
adjudication and is unwise banking policy. Furthermore, the court stated
that prohibiting banks from using confidential information might compel
them to enter loan transactions blindly, thus violating the banks' duties to
their own depositors,4 9 and might discourage loans to other companies ex-
pressing an interest in acquiring the stock of a bank customer.50
The court did not address, however, two questions related to the issue of
bank financing of takeovers. First, the Third Circuit did not decide
whether a bank actually may convey to an aggressor corporation informa-
tion obtained from the target corporation.5' Second, the court did not de-
cide the question of disseminating information from the loan department
to other bank departments, such as a trust department that recommends
investments to its clients.5 2 Although these issues seem clearly distinguish-
43. Id. at 602. The court considered actual misuse of confidential information as a basis
for the injunction, on the grounds that "a prevailing party can support a district court judg-
ment on any ground, including ones overlooked or rejected by the trial court." Id.; see
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n.6 (1970); United States v. American Ry. Express
Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435-36 (1924).
44. 602 F.2d at 602.
45. Id. at 602-03. Washington claimed that actual use occurred when the bank officer
in charge of the Washington account said nothing at the meeting at which the takeover loan
was discussed; the officer's silence arguably implied that the target was a wise investment.
Id. at 602-03.
46. Id. at 602-03. Washington urged the court to presume use of the information,
claiming that because of the aggressor's allegedly weak financial position, the bank would
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able from intradepartmental usage, the Washington decision represents a
general erosion of confidentiality in bank and corporate borrower relation-
ships. The decision leaves in doubt whether confidential loan information
will be protected by the courts from trust and investment department uses
and suggests that the banks must assume the burden of finding a means of
protecting such confidential information.5 3
Furthermore, the policy basis of the decision does not consider the tradi-
tional and pragmatic role of trust in business relationships or the effect of
diminishing that role.5 4 For example, if a company is concerned about a
possible takeover and, in particular, about an aggressor's using the target's
assets to pay off the loan used to finance the takeover, the target company
may hesitate to take a loan and disclose nonpublic financial information
that can be used by a bank in deciding whether to finance the takeover. 5
Rather, to avoid such disclosures, corporations may not take the loan or
they may seek to obtain their funds through sales of their own securities or
from foreign lenders. By finding no bank fiduciary duty to corporate bor-
rowers, the Washington court may have established barriers to the free
flow of commercial activity that it sought to encourage.
Corporate takeovers are increasingly common, and their success re-
quires fast, firm financing commitments.56 Affirmance of the district
court's decision enjoining the bank from participating in the takeover loan
might have allowed corporations to disperse their loan transactions and
ments, 86 BANKING L.J. 869 (1969); Herzel & Coiling, note 41 supra; Huck, The Fatal Lure
of the 7mpermeable Chinese Wall', 94 BANKING L.J. 100 (1977); Hunsicker, Conflicts of In-
terest, Economic Distortions and the Separation of Trust and Commercial Banking Functions,
50 S. CAL. L. REV. 611 (1977); Jacobsohn, Banks and Securities: The RegulatoryAgencies Get
Tougher, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 213 (1978); Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the
Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 459 (1975); Mendez-Peflate, The
Bank "Chinese Wall" Resolving and Contending with Conflicts of Duties, 93 BANKING L.J.
674 (1976); Schoenbaum, Bank Securities Activities and the Need to Separate Trust Depart-
mentsfrom Large Commercial Banks, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1976). For background on
the role of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lob-5 in regulating disclosure and
equality of information, see A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5 (Securities Law Series
Vols. 5-5B, 1980); H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW (Securi-
ties Law Series Vols. 3-3B, 1979). See also Harnischfeoer Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. Supp.
1151 (E.D. Wis. 1979). In Harnischfeger the plaintiff target company sued to enjoin a tender
offer. Although the court preliminarily enjoined the'tender offer because the proposed take-
over would be an antitrust violation, the court found that no breach of the "Chinese Wall"
created by the bank to maintain confidentiality between bank departments had occurred.
Id. at 1153-54.
53. See Herzel & Rosenberg, The Bank's Legal Problems, supra note 25, at 676-83;
Counsel's Corner: Takeover Financing-Maybe, 97 BANKING L.J. 50-51 (1980) (the Wash-
ington opinion may encourage authors of institutional ethics codes for commercial loan de-
partments to include explicit restrictions on what financial information concerning a target
may be disclosed to a potential acquirer).
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nonpublic information among major banks, thus providing a protective
shield against aggressor corporations and restricting the freedom of banks
to service competitors. Such a bank strategy is extremely impractical be-
cause of the large number of commercial banking institutions that are po-
tential takeover lenders. 57 The Third Circuit's reversal, however, moved
beyond American Medicorp and preserved the right of banks to finance the
activities of aggressor corporations and to use confidential information ob-
tained from target corporations in deciding whether to participate in that
financing. Accordingly, corporations are no longer assured that their con-
fidential financial information will not be used by banks in decisions in-
volving takeovers by other corporations.
III. CONCLUSION
In Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp. the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that a bank has no per se duty to refrain from loaning
money to a corporation attempting to acquire one of the bank's other cor-
porate customers that has provided the bank with confidential informa-
tion. In addition, a bank may use such confidential information in
deciding whether to finance the aggressor corporation's attempted acquisi-
tion. The court based its decision on policy reasons. A per se rule would
discourage banks from participating in loans to a present borrower's com-
petitors, thus diminishing the free flow of funds. A per se rule would also
enable corporations to protect themselves from possible takeover by dis-
persing their loans among major banks. Moreover, restricting banks' use
of confidential information might compel banks to enter loan transactions
blindly, violating their duties to their depositors. Finally, a restriction on
use of bank information is the province of the legislature.
In its decision, however, the court failed to consider the potentially det-
rimental effects of a loss of confidentiality in corporate borrower and bank
relationships. Although the court did not address the related issues of dis-
seminating confidential information to other bank departments or to ag-
gressor corporations, the court makes clear that nonpublic financial
information disclosed by a corporate borrower to banks' commercial loan
departments may now be used by banks in decisions concerning other
loans, including those to finance a takeover of a corporate borrower.
Rona R. Mears
57. See note 40 supra.
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